Key Points:

• China is learning from Russia’s challenges in Ukraine, focusing on better preparation and backup plans.
• Asymmetric warfare, like Ukraine’s drone use, could influence China’s Taiwan strategy.
• Predictable invasion points and the importance of intelligence are key considerations for China.
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Austin and Michael discuss the potential parallels between the Russia-Ukraine conflict and a possible China-Taiwan conflict. They explore how the lessons from Ukraine, such as the failure of Russia’s early strategies and the effectiveness of asymmetrical warfare, might influence China’s approach to Taiwan. Michael suggests that while the ongoing war in Ukraine may not directly impact China’s decision-making, it underscores the importance of having multiple backup plans and thorough preparation for any military action. The conversation also touches on how Taiwan might use similar strategies to Ukraine, leveraging intelligence and unconventional tactics to counter a more powerful adversary.

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Edited Video Transcript:

Now, when we talk about outside support, my mind immediately goes to the potential for a China-Taiwan conflict.

We’ve talked about this before and in many ways.

Is Ukraine a dry run, so to speak, for a major Western power trying to conquer another territory backed by another major Western power?

I know it’s not a perfect analogy, but it’s close enough.

So does the length of the Ukraine war and the fact that Russia’s early shock and awe, early dominance, decapitation strategy, but the failure of that is how does that change the expectation with China and Taiwan in the map there?

Sure.

Well, yeah, as you mentioned, I mean, I think China’s going to want to learn from this experience.

I think if the war continues in Ukraine for years, I don’t think that’s going to have a huge bearing on how China may or may not choose to press its claim in Taiwan.

There’s this thought, is the US military going to be distracted or overstretched by this?

But if you really get into the details of some of these aid packages that are going out to Ukraine, a lot of the money that is going out there is really just to replenish stocks of munitions.

So it’s not really leaving the United States.

So I don’t think that’s going to have a big bearing on how the United States might respond to tensions in Taiwan.

I think Beijing was perfectly aware that any kind of invasion of Taiwan is going to be a gigantic risk.

But I think the war in Ukraine is probably really underlying the importance of a solid plan and a backup plan and probably a backup plan.

For that backup plan, thorough preparation, a proper strategy.

And in a naval invasion, quick victories are not really on the cards.

You have to establish the beachhead and push forward, and the terrain doesn’t really allow for that.

But I think there are a lot of lessons, I think, that can be applied from this conflict and from history as well.

I think our main point of reference there would be the Pacific theater of World War II, which I think is what we’re going to move on to next.

Yeah, I would love to.

I’d love to move on to that.

But just to pause a bit there, maybe just hypothesizing some of the things that China might be observing and learning about the Ukraine-Russia conflict that could change the nature of a Taiwan reclamation project.

The power of asymmetry.

We’ve seen how effective Ukrainian forces have been against the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, despite the fact that Ukraine really doesn’t have a fleet.

That is one of the major features that China has an advantage over Taiwan, but maybe that benefit is overstated in a world of aquatic drones and just how effective Ukraine has utilized them.

Obviously, drones are a learning curve for both sides here with both Russia and Ukraine using them.

We would expect that to be part of a China-Taiwan conflict.

There’s probably also a major intelligence gap that it seems like China would need to fill.

Now, not to speak to the sophistication of Russia versus Chinese intelligence, but it would seem that in the Ukraine conflict, Ukraine has done disproportionately well by being slightly more aware of Russia’s movements and vice versa.

They’ve been able to intercept troop movements.

They’ve been able to be more effective on the informational side of this, which has helped their asymmetry.

So if you’re China, you have to be looking at those and anticipating that Taiwan playing the role of Ukraine in an equivalent conflict would be utilizing the same playbook.

Is that fair?

Yeah, I’d say so.

And again, naval invasion, so there is no element of surprise here.

And there are only about a dozen or so landing sites where they could ultimately choose so-called red beaches.

So they’re not going to be able to do anything terribly unexpected here.

That’s going to limit their options.

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