Key Points:

• Pacific Theater Lessons: Submarines played a crucial role in disrupting supply lines, a tactic that could be vital in a Taiwan conflict.
• Defense in Depth: Taiwan should prepare multiple defensive fallback points to slow down and inflict casualties on invading forces.
• Technological Evolution: New technologies like UUVs could play a significant role, though their effectiveness in real conflict remains theoretical.
• While the defense sector is capturing attention in 2025, the smart money is already looking to “the next Nvidia” for 2025’s biggest winners. Access the report for free now.

Michael and Austin discuss the lessons from the Pacific Theater in World War II and their relevance to potential future conflicts, particularly in the context of a naval invasion like a possible China-Taiwan scenario. They highlight the importance of submarines, the shift from battleships to aircraft carriers, and the dangers of forward deployment as a deterrent strategy. They also emphasize the need for Taiwan to adopt a defense in depth strategy and the potential role of unmanned underwater vehicles in modern warfare.

Watch the Video

Edited Video Transcript:

[00:00:00] Austin Smith: So, so let’s talk a little bit about the pacific theater. It’s a really interesting theater. It’s got a storied history in terms of naval conflicts and you mentioned one of the most important right now, which is in a naval invasion. There is no surprise attack. There is no shock and awe or early decapitation.

[00:00:17] Austin Smith: You signal everything. Um, and you’re the invading army that doesn’t have the element of surprise. So what did we learn from the pacific theater in World War Two? that might apply to a future conflict?

[00:00:31] Michael Muir: Sure. Well, I think there’s a few key lessons. Um, obviously it’s not going to be one to one because past failures or successes aren’t necessarily, um, going to play out in a future conflict.

[00:00:44] Michael Muir: Um, you know, we, to give a, another example, you know, in World War II, the allies, the British and the French were in a different theater, but we’ll get back to Pacific in a second. They were essentially trying to refight World War I with more effective tactics than Germany were. Or less obliging because they came up with an entirely new strategy, um, which paid off.

[00:01:02] Michael Muir: So with the Pacific theater, I think, um, there’s a really underrated aspect of this conflict. Now, when you say Pacific theater, you think aircraft carriers, you think Midway, you think Island topping. Um, but one really important aspect of this war that I think people aren’t as aware is the role played by submarines.

[00:01:19] Michael Muir: Um, the Japanese were extremely negligent in protecting shipping lanes and the allies wreaked havoc. On, uh, Japanese, uh, Japanese supply line, um, submarines sank thousands, uh, millions of tons of supplies that the Japanese badly needed, um, and they crippled the Japanese war, um, war machine from under the seas, um, naval aircraft as well, uh, played a huge role, um, so, uh, Submarines, um, I think could play an extremely important role in any invasion scenario with Taiwan, um, despite advances in modern technology, they’re still very difficult to detect, um, and the key for Taiwan is going to be, you know, damaging as much of the Chinese fleet on route as they can.

[00:02:04] Michael Muir: Submarines will play a huge role in that. Um, Another aspect of the Pacific Theater in World War Two was the fundamental change in naval warfare that took place. Um, you know, prior to World War Two, most Assumptions were around the importance of the primacy of battleships. Um, but that changed towards aircraft carriers.

[00:02:25] Michael Muir: Part of that, you know, was a consequence of the attack on Pearl Harbor and the damage done to battleships. And it was, you know, in a much wider area. The importance of aircraft carriers, um, became apparent. So what we saw in World War II was a fundamental shift in the most important ship. Uh, we may see something like that again.

[00:02:43] Michael Muir: It may be that the. What we weren’t aware of, you know, in the 1930s with the battleships, they had actually come and gone. Perhaps the aircraft carriers day has come and gone and we’re just not aware of it yet. Um, I’d say its main value now could be in deterrence, but the other lesson that we can learn from the Pacific theater is the danger of forward deployment as a deterrent strategy.

[00:03:05] Michael Muir: Um, in the past, not just World War Two, but in the 1950s and 1990s, the U. S. was able to send fleets to the Taiwan Strait to calm things down. Um, I don’t think that is necessarily a viable option anymore. This kind of brinkmanship is quite dangerous because, um, A deterrent force, if it’s not deterring, becomes a very tempting target.

[00:03:30] Austin Smith: And just for the sake of our listeners, when you mean forward deployment, what you mean is getting ships or a show of force closer to a potential conflict as a way Paradoxically of calming it down of saying, Hey, you know, the, the, the big heavy is here. It’s within striking distance. Let’s keep things cool.

[00:03:47] Austin Smith: Right. Is that in effect what you’re saying?

[00:03:49] Michael Muir: That was, um, so the carrier gambit has been used in the past. It was used in the 1950s. So the seventh fleet was sent to the Taiwan Strait to deter an invasion of Taiwan, uh, during the Korean war. And then again, in 1996, under the Clinton administration, when the Chinese were conducting missile tests, uh, by one straight.

[00:04:07] Michael Muir: So the problem with that now is. You know, China’s military is a lot more capable. Um, they’ve invested a lot in munitions specifically to take down carriers. Um, and in some war games that have been run, um, in the Taiwan scenario, they found that if there was a forward deploy, uh, you know, the forward deployed fleet, it would be very vulnerable and the U.

[00:04:25] Michael Muir: S. could lose a couple of carriers from that and the loss of a carrier, it would be a Absolute catastrophe for the United States military because there’s simply no way of quickly replacing them and obviously a huge loss of life and prestige. The danger of forward deployment is apparent and I think another lesson that can be taken from the Pacific theater is something Taiwan would want to pay close attention to is the value of defense in depth.

[00:04:53] Michael Muir: And what I mean by that is for opposing an amphibious landing, it’s not just defending the beach. It would be opposing that initial landing and having several fallback points to inflict a lot of casualties. Now, the thing about the Chinese military, as we’ve discussed before, you know, we brought up the peace diseases.

[00:05:10] Michael Muir: This is not an operationally experienced military. Amphibious landings are very difficult. I expect that even if they did get forces on the beaches, um, they There would be morale could be an issue, might not be very well led. There have been concerns in some of the intelligence reports that well, declassified stuff.

[00:05:30] Michael Muir: So obviously I don’t have the most up to date information, but China is concerned about the quality of its officers, the lack of experience. So morale could be weak, um, disorganization. So if they oppose the initial landing and then fall back to another strong point and PLA tries to advance and then every point, that they reach, they fall back.

[00:05:49] Michael Muir: They’re losing a lot of men each time. We saw something similar, um, in World War II, another theater, World War II, when the Allies landed in Italy. The Axis forces just kept pulling back to another defensive bridge, uh, and it took years when it was supposed to be the soft underbelly. Um, and for Taiwan, buying time in the initial stages of the invasion is absolutely crucial.

[00:06:10] Michael Muir: Um, so preparing multiple fallback points, um, would be a really advisable thing, um, for Taiwan to do.

[00:06:18] Austin Smith: So, yeah, I mean, certainly the defense in depth strategy, almost like multiple firewalls is important and you’re bringing it all the way back to your first point, I’m also thinking of defense in the depths, right?

[00:06:28] Austin Smith: You know, the submarines and how quickly they change the calculus of war here. And, you know, maybe it, maybe it’s not manned submarines. We might be in the era of UUVs or uncrewed underwater vehicles in the same way we’re now transitioning. To unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs, but nonetheless, that format, right?

[00:06:46] Austin Smith: That format of war, the idea of a submersible that can wreak havoc. It’s highly asymmetric. It could be, you know, particularly in a UUV world, it could be potentially a lot more faster, nimbler. It can stay underwater longer. It could be cheaper, um, to produce than a submarine. You also don’t have the same risk of life.

[00:07:04] Austin Smith: loss. So you could be a little bit more aggressive with how you deploy them. So that point of, you know, maybe summer, you know, learning from the Pacific theater and how much submarines dominated there. The newest iteration of submarines could just further extend, uh, you know, that, that lesson there. And, you know, that, that really is the vehicle of choice in the format for that conflict.

[00:07:25] Michael Muir: Potentially, yeah, but we should also remember there’s always a gap between a weapon being introduced and becoming effective. Fair. Very good point. Very good point.

[00:07:33] Austin Smith: Um, what I would say is

[00:07:34] Michael Muir: I wouldn’t rest everything on something that’s not necessarily been proven, but I think a multifaceted approach is the most viable going forward.

[00:07:43] Austin Smith: Certainly theoretical at this point, so that’s a great, that’s a great disclaimer. Good to mention that. Um, although we have seen, you know, necessity is the mother of ingenuity when it comes to Ukraine and the ways they’ve adapted to drones and UAVs have been remarkable. Yeah, so I

[00:07:58] Michael Muir: imagine there are probably some things we haven’t even occurred to us, um, that might.

[00:08:03] Michael Muir: You know, be deployed in an emergency situation, like you say, so, and again, we’re talking theoretical. We’re talking about things that there’s no guarantee any of this will happen, of course, but I think it’s actually essential to be aware of some of the lessons that we can take from from the Pacific theater, because that is our main point of reference.

[00:08:20] Michael Muir: I think another thing that is worth pointing out is at the end of the Chinese civil war, you know, which was an overwhelming defeat for the nationalists. But, um. The People’s Republic did attempt to take Cayman Islands, the Cayman Islands, which are just a few miles off of the coast, and they failed. Um, so that just shows that even with overwhelming military supremacy, amphibious landings against the defeated force are still huge risk.

[00:08:46] Michael Muir: Um, obviously it’s a different scenario now, but, uh, the Republic of China or Taiwan have form for resisting amphibious invasions from the People’s Republic.

[00:08:56] Austin Smith: Um, really great context there. Thank you. And, um, yeah, I don’t think anybody, you know, after this will be under any, uh, assumption that this would be an easy conflict for either side.

Thank you for reading! Have some feedback for us?
Contact the 24/7 Wall St. editorial team.