Key Points:

• US Focus: Likely naval and air force operations, avoiding direct attacks on China.
• Crucial Weapons: Long-range munitions and submarines to target invading Chinese forces.
• Challenges: China’s proximity and full military mobilization could limit US effectiveness.
• While the defense sector is capturing attention in 2025, the smart money is already looking to “the next Nvidia” for 2025’s biggest winners. Access the report for free now.

Michael and Austin discuss the potential U.S. military response if China were to invade Taiwan, emphasizing the strategic decisions involved in weapon deployment. They explore the political dimensions, noting bipartisan support for Taiwan but likely restrictions on escalating the conflict to mainland China. The conversation focuses on the types of weapons the U.S. might use, such as long-range munitions and submarines, to inflict damage on an invading fleet. They also consider the challenges of U.S. air superiority, given China’s ability to concentrate its forces close to home.

Watch the Video

Edited Video Transcript:

Let’s zoom back in.

If the U.S. was to assist Taiwan in a Chinese invasion, what weapons would they use?

And this is a particularly interesting one because the issue of which weapons and which restrictions are placed on them has been a key facet of the Russia-Ukrainian war.

With Ukraine saying we need further reaching weapons and more permission to use them freely, and Western nations saying you can only get this and only use it in this manner, and very slowly ratcheting that up.

Some people have claimed that that approach by Western nations has needlessly prolonged the war.

Other people would say that it has prevented the conflict from escalating too quickly into a global conflict.

So the topic of which weapons the U.S. could use to defend Taiwan is more important than it may seem on the surface.

At least what we’re seeing in Ukraine, it is about sending a message.

It’s about sending the right amount of force and trying paradoxically to contain the conflict as opposed to escalate it.

So with that lens, what do we think the U.S. could put into action in Taiwan?

Yeah, well, let’s really quickly just go to the political dimension of this, as you’ve mentioned.

I think that there are gonna be restrictions if there was a U.S. intervention that would really want to contain that conflict.

However, you know, there is a lot of bipartisan support for Taiwan.

So I think the question of whether or not the United States would intervene, I don’t think is going to be subject to partisan gridlock.

You know, the Taiwan Congressional Caucus is one of the largest, in fact, it may even be the largest bipartisan body in Congress.

So that’s not going to be an issue.

But I don’t think things like attacks on the Chinese mainland are going to be viable.

I think they’re probably going to be restrictions there.

Something we might see if we look at the war in 1982 in the Falklands, there was an exclusion zone around the islands.

So it might be that the U.S. declares this around Taiwan and surrounding area as an exclusion zone.

And anything that enters there is fair game.

That might be one way.

But I don’t think there’s going to be full-scale war against China.

It will be primarily fought.

Whatever American forces take part will primarily be the Navy and the Air Force.

You know, once if an invasion was to be launched, Taiwan would be surrounded.

So there’d be no way of getting ground forces there anyway.

But I think in that scenario, and again, as we’ve talked about, you know, China’s investment in anti-access area denial munitions would make carriers too great a risk.

So long-range munitions from the United States side, like JASSMs or JASSMs with extended range, they’re very difficult to detect.

And they could make a huge difference in causing a lot of attrition to an invading fleet.

And obviously, the more transport of supply ships that are sunk on route, the less work Taiwan actually has to do in defending itself.

So that could be a key factor.

You know, if you look at D-Day in the first 24 hours, I believe it was something like 90,000 troops were landed in that first 24 hours.

That was crucial.

China won’t be able to land anything like that in the first few hours.

And more troop transports that are lost on the way there or the way back, the fewer that can come in the second wave and the third wave and so on.

So that’s going to be crucial.

We talked about submarines, and underwater drones as well could have a huge impact.

I think the key for any American intervention is just inflicting too much damage on the invading fleet to be able to complete the conquest.

I don’t think carriers will actually be terribly helpful in this conflict simply because, again, China are prepared for them, and the number of fixed-wing aircraft that are carried by them just aren’t sufficient.

This would be a very rare situation where the United States probably wouldn’t enjoy air superiority.

The Air Force, you know, because what we have to remember here is that in the scenario of an American intervention, China would be able to dedicate its entire Air Force, entire Navy to the conflict that’s happening in its back garden, whereas the United States wouldn’t be able to do that.

And that is more than just, as we have talked about in prior episodes, your entire Air Force is, it’s more than just the planes in combat.

It’s the entire mechanism to support them.

To refuel them, to arm them, to get munitions to them.

And the proximity to the mainland, the ability to conduct, you know, flight from the mainland and reach Taiwan without the need of a carrier.

I mean, as big as a carrier is, it’s not as big as the actual land surface of China.

So there’s many, many more ways that China could dominate that conflict.

That’s an interesting point that I haven’t considered.

Yeah, well, you know, the Chinese Air Force, again, like the Chinese military at large, suffers from a huge lack of operational experience.

I think the last time the Chinese Air Force shot down an opposing aircraft, I’ll have to double-check this, but I think it wasn’t, it hasn’t been since the 1960s.

So they have a huge gap in operational experience.

The U.S. Air Force definitely does not lack operational experience in terms of quality.

You know, I think the F-35 is better than anything that China has.

But it’s not going to matter too much if there aren’t enough of them or if they can’t get their insufficient number.

So that operational and qualitative advantage the U.S. Air Force has over the Chinese Air Force may not count for anything if they can’t get there.

Thank you for reading! Have some feedback for us?
Contact the 24/7 Wall St. editorial team.