Key Points:

• US Focus: Likely naval and air force operations, avoiding direct attacks on China.
• Crucial Weapons: Long-range munitions and submarines to target invading Chinese forces.
• Challenges: China’s proximity and full military mobilization could limit US effectiveness.
• While the defense sector is capturing attention in 2025, the smart money is already looking to “the next Nvidia” for 2025’s biggest winners. Access the report for free now.

Michael and Austin discuss the potential U.S. military response if China were to invade Taiwan, emphasizing the strategic decisions involved in weapon deployment. They explore the political dimensions, noting bipartisan support for Taiwan but likely restrictions on escalating the conflict to mainland China. The conversation focuses on the types of weapons the U.S. might use, such as long-range munitions and submarines, to inflict damage on an invading fleet. They also consider the challenges of U.S. air superiority, given China’s ability to concentrate its forces close to home.

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Edited Video Transcript:

[00:00:00] Austin Smith: Let’s, let’s zoom back in. You know what, you know, if, if the U. S. was to assist Taiwan in a Chinese invasion, um, what weapons would they use? And this is a particularly interesting one because the, the issue of which weapons and which restrictions are placed on them has been a key facet of the Russia Ukrainian war, with Ukraine saying we need further reaching weapons and more permission to use them freely.

[00:00:24] Austin Smith: And western nations saying you can only get this and only use it in this manner and very slowly ratcheting that up Some people have claimed that that um approach by western nations has needlessly prolonged the war Other people would say that it has prevented the conflict from escalating too quickly into a global conflict so the the topic of which weapons the u.

[00:00:44] Austin Smith: s could use to defend taiwan is is More important than it may seem on the surface, at least what we’re seeing in Ukraine, it is about sending a message. It’s about sending the right amount of force and trying paradoxically to contain the conflict as opposed to escalate it. So with that lens, what do we think the U.

[00:01:03] Austin Smith: S. could put into action in Taiwan?

[00:01:05] Michael Muir: Yeah, well, let’s, um, let’s really quickly just Go to the political dimension of this, as you’ve mentioned. Um, you know, I think that there are going to be restrictions if this, you know, if there was a U. S. intervention, they would really want to contain that conflict. Um, however, you know, there is a lot of bipartisan support for Taiwan.

[00:01:26] Michael Muir: So I think the question of whether or not the United States would intervene, I don’t think is going to be subject to partisan gridlock. You know, the Taiwan Congressional Caucus is one of the largest, in fact, it might even be the largest bipartisan body in Congress. So that’s not going to be an issue, but I don’t think things like attacks on the Chinese mainland are going to be viable.

[00:01:48] Michael Muir: Well, I think there. Probably going to be restrictions there. Something we might see if we look at the war in 1982 in the Falklands, there was an exclusion zone around the islands. So it might be that the US declares, you know, this around Taiwan and surrounding area as an inclusion zone. And anything that enters there is fair game.

[00:02:07] Michael Muir: Um, that might be one way, um, but I don’t think there’s going to be full scale war against China. It will be primarily fought, whatever, uh, American forces take part will primarily be the Navy and the Air Force. Um, you know, once, if an invasion was to be launched, Taiwan would be surrounded. So there’d be no way of getting ground forces there anyway.

[00:02:28] Michael Muir: Um, but I think in that scenario, and again, as we’ve talked about, you know, China’s Uh, investment in, um, anti access area denial munitions would make carriers to greater risk. Um, so long range munitions from the United States side, um, you know, like JASMs or JASMs with extended range. Um, they’re very difficult to detect and they could make a huge difference in, uh, causing a lot of attrition to an invading fleet.

[00:02:56] Michael Muir: And obviously the more transported supply ships that are sunk on route, the less work that Taiwan actually has to do in defending itself. So that could be a key factor. You know, if you look at D Day in the first 24 hours, I believe it was something like 90, 000 troops were landed in that first 24 hours.

[00:03:13] Michael Muir: And that was crucial. China won’t be able to land anything like that. In the first few hours and more troop transports that are lost on the way there on the way back, the fewer that can come in the 2nd wave and the 3rd wave and so on. So that’s going to be crucial. We talked about submarines and underwater drones as well.

[00:03:30] Michael Muir: Could have a huge impact. Um, I think the key, um, for any American intervention is just inflicting too much damage on the inflating fleet to be able to complete the conquest. Um, I don’t think carriers will actually be terribly helpful in this conflict, um, simply because, again, China are prepared for them, and the number of fixed wing aircraft that are carried by them just aren’t sufficient.

[00:03:51] Michael Muir: This would be a very rare situation where the United States would Probably wouldn’t enjoy air superiority. Um, the air force, you know, because what we have to remember here is that in the scenario of an American intervention, China would be able to dedicate its entire air force, entire Navy to the conflict.

[00:04:09] Michael Muir: It’s happening in its back garden, whereas the United States wouldn’t be able to do that. So,

[00:04:15] Austin Smith: and that that is more than just as we have talked about in prior episodes. You know, your, your entire air air force is, it’s more than just the planes in combat. It’s the entire mechanism to support them, to refuel them, to arm them, to get munitions to them.

[00:04:29] Austin Smith: And the proximity to the mainland, the ability to conduct, you know, flight from the mainland and reach Taiwan without the need of a carrier. I mean, as big as a carrier is. It’s not as big as the actual land surface of China. So there’s many, many more ways that China could dominate that conflict. That’s an interesting point that I hadn’t considered.

[00:04:48] Michael Muir: Yeah. Well, um, you know, the Chinese air force, again, like the Chinese military at large suffers from a huge lack of operational experience. I think the last time the Chinese air force shot down on opposing aircraft off the double checklist, but I think it wasn’t, it hasn’t been since the 1960s. Um, so they have a huge gap in operational experience.

[00:05:07] Michael Muir: The U. S. Air Force definitely does not lack operational experience. Um, in terms of quality, you know, I think the F 35 is better than anything, uh, that China has, but it’s not gonna matter too much if there aren’t enough of them or if they can’t get there. Insufficient number. So that operational and qualitative, uh, qualitative advantage of the U S air force has over the Chinese air force may not count for anything if they can’t get there.

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