Key Points:

• Japan’s Role: Japan’s cooperation is vital for U.S. support in defending Taiwan.
• U.S. Action: Swift and decisive U.S. intervention is crucial, but avoiding conflict is the best strategy.
• China’s Challenges: China’s economic issues may limit its capacity for future conflicts.
• While the defense sector is capturing attention in 2025, the smart money is already looking to “the next Nvidia” for 2025’s biggest winners. Access the report for free now.

Michael and Austin discuss the factors beyond U.S. intervention that would be crucial in defending Taiwan against a potential Chinese invasion. They emphasize the importance of Japan as a key regional ally, particularly in allowing the use of air bases for U.S. forces. They also consider other allies, such as South Korea, though the involvement of North Korea could complicate matters. The conversation highlights the need for Taiwan to delay an invasion long enough for U.S. support to arrive and explores the potential economic and diplomatic challenges China might face in the future, which could alter its plans.

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[00:00:00] Austin Smith: What other factors beyond U. S. intervention, which we’ve talked at length about, would be key to saving Taiwan? Because as, as, as powerful and potent as the U. S. is, they are not Taiwan’s only potential ally. They are not Taiwan’s only potential, um, way of getting, you know, munitions or, or equipment to save themselves.

[00:00:19] Austin Smith: So what are, what are some of the other keys that Taiwan is considering beyond just U. S. support and intervention?

[00:00:25] Michael Muir: Yeah, so you make a really important point by bringing up other partners in this conflict. And as I said, the U. S. Air Force can’t do an awful lot if it can’t reach, um, you know, the contested airspace.

[00:00:37] Michael Muir: So one of the most important partners regionally would be Japan. Um, now we, Japan has a pacifist constitution and is not likely to, you know, fight wars of aggression, but this would be a defensive war. Um, they wouldn’t necessarily have to get involved. They would just have to agree to let the U. S. use the airbases that it already has on Japanese soil.

[00:00:58] Michael Muir: Um, so there’s a Canada airport, um, airbase, excuse me, on Okinawa. There’s a couple in Kyushu, um, that would also be, you know, in play. Um, as far as Japan’s willingness to do this, and they know that if they did allow their bases to use it to be used, they would be at risk of attack from China, um, that would draw Japan into the war.

[00:01:19] Michael Muir: But they have indicated a willingness to help defend Taiwan because, you know, it’s not just altruism, it is their own strategic self-interest. If Taiwan falls, then. Their own territory is now a security risk. So keeping Taiwan as a de facto independent sovereign sort of ally is in their own interest. And although Japan has, you know, strictly defensive forces, their self defense maritime forces are amongst the largest in the world.

[00:01:48] Michael Muir: Um, and that could tilt the, uh, potential, uh, worst scenario where the U S Pacific fleet, the Japanese fleet and the Taiwanese fleet combined. could be a, if not an exact match for the PL Navy, then certainly could make life very difficult for them. Japan has a pretty good number of modern submarines, which could take part in, um, you know, really inflicting a lot of damage on Chinese shipping.

[00:02:11] Michael Muir: Another ally that could be drawn in, but I don’t think will be, would be South Korea. And I think the problem with that would be just, you know, the ever present threat of North Korea, which could become a factor. You know, like Beijing does have influence over Pyongyang and might want them to launch a, sort of diversionary attack.

[00:02:27] Michael Muir: But I think that’s an escalation that is less likely, but that’s something that South Korea would be conscious of and very unwilling to get involved in any conflict. So yeah, Japanese cooperation is essential. They don’t necessarily have to be part of the war, but they would have to allow their air bases to be used.

[00:02:44] Michael Muir: And they probably would. We’ve mentioned submarines and long range munitions, um, making sure there are plenty of those. I mean, you can’t Magically make a lot of submarines between now and, you know, around about 2027, 2028. Um, but just having that availability is important. Um, JASMs and JASMs with extended range, I think are going to be really important because they’re so difficult to detect.

[00:03:07] Michael Muir: Um, and they could be very damaging to the Chinese fleet. Um, but ultimately I think the biggest factor of all is the United States response. Now we, you know, we’ve talked making the assumption that U. S. would intervene. Um, but. That’s not a guarantee, of course, because of the aforementioned consequences of a war between the United States and China.

[00:03:27] Michael Muir: Um, so if the U. S. does get involved, they have to do a couple of things. One, they have to, uh, respond quickly and decisively. Um, there can’t be any equivocating. It can’t be any You know, they have to forgive the full throated Full support of Taiwan from the very beginning and get support there as quickly as possible.

[00:03:47] Michael Muir: And Taiwan is going to have to do a lot of heavy lifting on its own to be sure. Um, secondly, the US is going to have to accept that this is going to be an extremely damaging war. Um, even in the best case scenario, it will be, you know, You know, the most destructive war the United States has fought since World War II, without a doubt, and that long term recovery can’t be overlooked.

[00:04:08] Michael Muir: So, having said all of that, the best strategy, of course, is to avoid the war in the first place. Um, and that is something that, you know, naval commanders in the Pacific really emphasize. Um, but the issue there, of course, is getting support to Taiwan before the war happens, which can often, you know, come with, uh, political consequences, you know, uh, entanglements.

[00:04:29] Michael Muir: It’s sometimes a difficult sell to indefinitely support a nation that’s not actually at war yet. But the more support that goes to Taiwan today, Could prevent a war tomorrow, um, and I think even if the United States succeeds in holding off the Chinese invasion of Taiwan, they’ve still lost just by being involved in such a destructive conflict.

[00:04:50] Michael Muir: So the key is avoiding it in the first place.

[00:04:52] Austin Smith: Uh, saved advice as ever. You know, it seems blithe to say, but of course, you know, the best strategy in any war is to avoid it entirely. And we certainly hope for the people of every conflict that we’ve discussed here, that that is on the table and immediate possibility.

[00:05:05] Austin Smith: You know, no one wants to see, uh, any nation go to war. Least of all superpowers like China, the U S you know, via Taiwan. Uh, South Korea, North Korea, you know, uh, there’s too much conflict in the world. Unfortunately, it does still seem to be, um, in an environment where we’re not fully, we’re not in the fully peaceful era, unfortunately.

[00:05:26] Austin Smith: So, um,

[00:05:26] Michael Muir: you know, we can’t be naive either. You know, we have to acknowledge that just because such a conflict is unthinkable, um, doesn’t mean that it can’t happen and doesn’t mean that the U. S. and its allies shouldn’t be prepared for it. And I do think there are. Moves towards that. But ultimately I think deterrence is going to be more difficult going forward.

[00:05:46] Michael Muir: Um, and there’s no guarantee China would invade Taiwan. You know, we, the, the, the, uh, security analysis suggests that they’ll have the capability in 2027, 2028. It doesn’t mean they’re going to, um, we just have to ensure that it’s just, and they know it would be difficult. We just have to. Try to make sure that they think it’s impossible and then try to work around a kind of diplomatic solution.

[00:06:08] Michael Muir: Um, you know, strategic ambiguity is worked up to this point, not quite knowing if the U. S. would intervene or not. We might need to move to a more assertive posture, but that in turn would have political and economic consequences. So there’s no easy path forward, I think would be the final point to make here.

[00:06:24] Austin Smith: Absolutely. And, you know, we may actually find that China is fighting a different kind of war by the time they would be in a position to invade Taiwan. And that is, that is economic. You know, there are a lot, there are so many reports about the weakness in the Chinese economy and all of the stimulus that is now being injected into trying to keep things afloat.

[00:06:41] Austin Smith: We have no idea which way that will go. You know, economists, um, you know, even the most well read on this subject can’t tell you with certainty, but China might find itself in a much different economic position in a few years when they. Perhaps we’re planning to invade Taiwan, and they might be fighting an economic war, whether it’s, you know, some combination of the Chips Act or sanctions or their own population cresting or an imbalance of an old and young population, the collapse of their real estate business or real estate economy rather.

[00:07:09] Austin Smith: Um, which was hugely intertwined with their banks. Um, China may just not be in a position to fight two wars, one economic and one literal, um, when they were planning to invade. So, uh, you know, the, we will see the, the, the world is unknowable. But, um, Michael, I, I really appreciate all of your, your context and, and your sage advice here.

[00:07:29] Austin Smith: And thank you for helping, uh, our listeners understand the, the multidimensional, uh, characteristics here that we see on the world today. Of course, anytime. Thank you.

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